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UNETHICAL DEBT COLLECTION:




Consumer credit transactions in the United States now involve billions of dollars
annually. I When, inevitably, a portion of that debt is not paid when due, creditors
resort first to extrajudicial collection methods. Typically this involves turning the
account over to an independent agency, which attempts to recover the debt in return
for a percentage of the sum due.
The collection practices employed by such agencies range from the admirably
restrained to the abhorrently barbaric: the latter have occasionally provoked legislative
reaction in a number of statehouses, and, most recently, in Congress.
On October 9, 1975, Rep. Frank Annunzio (D., Ill.) introduced a bill which
would amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act -- the "Truth in Lending" law 2 -- to
prohibit abusive practices by debt collectors. The provisions of this bill, as a product of
past difficulties in this area and the corrective legislation which has previously been
enacted to meet them, is considered here. 3
II. The Collection Process
Collectors quite universally initiate the recovery of a debt by notifying the debtor
by mail that they have been retained to collect the bill, and perhaps hinting at the
unpleasant ramifications of a failure to pay. If there is no response, or an unsatisfactory
one, the letters become increasingly frequent and vitriolic. 4 The letters may simulate
legal process, "ordering" the debtor to appear at a specified address (the agency's office)
to answer charges, or may be otherwise misleading or misrepresentative.
At some point the agency begins to intersperse or substitute telephone calls to the
debtor's home or business; the calls may come at all hours, I and in a seemingly
incessant series. 6 The debtor is often subjected to obscenities, unwarranted threats of
legal action, and various insults to his honesty and character. 7
When direct appeals fail, calls and letters to the debtor's friends, neighbors,
relatives, and -- especially -- employer, follow. The collector notifies the debtor's
acquaintances of the account and cajols them into pursuing the matter with the debtor.
Contact with the employer is a favorite tactic, and an effective one. 8 The caller points
out the disadvantages of employing "unreliable" workers, and hints darkly of the
accounting costs which will surely follow an attachment of the employee's wages; soon
the boss is ordering the worker to straighten the problem out, or else. The employee,
whose delinquency was perhaps precipitated by unforeseen emergencies, responds to the
* B.A, St. Francis College, Biddeford, Maine, 1975; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1978.
1. E.g., in a recent year, total consumer credit was $157.58 billion. Fed. Res. Bull. (A54 - April, 1973).
2. Consumer Credit Protection Act, d5 U.S.C. Sects. 1601-1665 (1968); amended, Pub. L. No. 42-495 (Oct. 28, 1974).
3. Obviously, innumerable issues bearing on the topic, such aS the relative merit ot the debtor s and creditor's interests.
and the issue of freedom of contract versus public policy considerations, cannot be adequately discussed. Thus the
assumption is made that delinquent debtors deserve protection from flagrantly offensive collection methods, whatever
the validity of the creditor's claim.
4. See Comment, Effectivi y Regulating Extrajudicial Collection of Debts. 20 Maine L. Rev. 261 (1958).
5. E.g.. Advance Loan Senice v. Mandik. 306 S.W. 2d 754 (Tx. Civ. App. 1957); calls at 5:30 a.m. and 10 p.m.
6, E.g.. Pioneer Finance and Thrift Corp. v. Adams. 426 S.W. 2d 317 (Tx. Civ. App. 1968); thirty per calls per week for
two weeks.
7. E.g.. Barnett v. Collection Service Co.. 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty. 126
. Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
8. See comment. Creditor's Pre-judgment Communication to Debtors Emplo),er: An Evaluation. 36 BrooklYn L. Rev. 95
(1969).
continuous badgering with illness, lowered productivity, and absenteeism. 9 Even more
severe symptoms, including miscarriage -u and temporary insanity, 11 have been induced
by such pressure.
1Ii. Tort Theories of Recover-,
Relief from these and similar practices has traditionally been sought in tort. Such
suits have met with only limited success, due to either the plaintiff's failure to
demonstrate all elements requisite to the action, or the defendant's success in asserting
a recognized defense-or privilege. The most frequent theories upon which debtors have
relied are defamation, intentional interference with contractual relations, invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of mental distress.
The failure of defamation actions brought by debtors whose reputations are being
ruined, effectively illustrate the impotence of tort remedies for many problems in this
area. The principal difficulty here is that, since falsity is an element of the tort, truth of
the debt is a defense -- in most states an absolute one. There is some recognition that
publication of objectively true facts which impute falsely may be actionable, 12 but such
insinuations are neither commonly obvious nor easily proven. The publication
requirement may also present obstacles to recovery: some courts have held, for example,
that notification of an employer does not constitute publication sufficient to maintain
the action. 13
Communication with the employer has also been the source of actions for
intentional interference with contractual relations. Most often this theory has been
ineffective, since it requires not only knowledge by the defendant of the relationship,
but intent to induce breach, and breach proximately resulting. 14 It is exceptionally
difficult to prove that the collector intended, or must have expected, that his
conversations would result in the employee's dismissal. Also, since weight is placed on
the maliciousness of the interference, many courts give wide berth to the creditor, who
-- ostensibly at least -- is protecting his legitimate interests. Where the debtor is not
discharged, no action will lie, despite the possible impairment of his status and
opportunities for advancement. 15
Invasion of privacy, on the basis either of intrusion into one's solitude, or public
disclosure of private facts, has proven more hospitable to debtors' complaints, perhaps
because of its more recent vintage. 16 In fact, the first real use of the public disclosure
theory involved an overdue debt, and a creditor's publication of it.
Nevertheless, flaws have appeared here as well. Disclosure actions have failed
where disclosure was made to plaintiffs employer, 18 or to any other individual, or even
to small groups, I) apparently on the basis that "public disclosure" must be more
extensive than technical publication. Intrusion suits based on harassing phone calls
have met with some success, 20 yet other courts have refused to hold the defendant
liable, on the grounds that, as to the creditor, either the matter was not entitled to
protection or, similarly, that the assumption of the debt was also an implicit consent to
9. See, e.g.. Advance Loan Seri-ices v. Alandik. supra at n. 5.
10. Kirby v.Jules Chain Stores Grp.. 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 626 (1936).
11. Mell v. Edge. 68 Ca. App. 314, 22 S.E 2d 738 (1942).
12. Weston v. Barnicot. 175 Ma. 454, 56 N.E. 619 (1900).
13, Gouldmian-Taber Pontiac v. Zerbst. 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E 2d 881 (1957).
14. Proier. The Lau, of Torts Sect. 129 (4th ed. 1971).
15i There appear to be no cases, in this regard, concerning interference with prospective advantage.
16. Trammel v. Citizen \'euws Co.. 285 KY. 529. 148 S.W. 2d 708 (1941); Tollfson v. Prie. 247 Ore. 398, 430 P. 2d 990
(1967).
17. Brents v. Morgan. 221 Kv. 765, 299 SW.. 867 (1927).
18. Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge. 252 Md. 531. 250 A. 2d 878 (1969).
19. Prosser. supra. Sect. 117 at 810.
20. Carey v. Statewide Fin. Co.. 3 Conn. C.C. 716. 233 A. 2d 405 (1966).
correspondence concerning it.
Another modern tort, intentional infliction of mental distress, has also failed to
meet the debtor's needs, except in cases of extreme outrage. 21 The prevailing principle
still appears to be that, in such cases, up to a yet-undefined point, "a certain toughening
of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be." 22 In fact, a
number of courts have yet to recognize the tort itself, 23 much less place such activities
within its realm. Here, too, arises the recurring problem of establishing an intentional
injury on the basis of conduct whose foundation, at least, has merit. In suits by debtors,
the "extreme outrage" frontier is less easily crossed than in the general run of cases.
The availability of defenses, the lack of required elements, the conflicts over
malice, intent, and the creditor's fundamentally legitimate interest, as well as the often
intangible psychological damage complained of, have all contributed to the impotence
of tort remedies in this area. The more modern torts have been more useful, but, like all
the common law, they have grown slowly, and precedent is still shaping their
boundaries. Recognition of these difficulties has led to the conviction that the
legislature is in a more advantageous position to respond to the apparent need.
IV. Statutory Regulation
Legislative and administrative regulation of debt collection agencies and practices
is widespread. Roughly half the states, as well as thefederal government through the
Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.), oversee collection agencies. Nevertheless, such
regulation has proven incapable either of encompassing the range of offensive tactics
employed or, more frequently, of providing adequate remedies.
A. Licensing Statutes
A number of states attempt, through the use of licensing statutes, both to regulate
entry into the business of collecting debts, and to control those agencies already
licensed. 24 A typical provision specifies requirements and procedures for licensing, plus
a list of prohibited practices and (or,in the alternative) an umbrella proscription of
"unethical practices." 25 Common penalties for unauthorized collecting are fines,
imprisonment, or both. 26 Licensed collectors who violate the acts are usually subject to
revocation of their license, but in actuality, since the regulations are often enforced by
a board comprised largely of collection agency executives, the exercise of their highly
discretionary duties is often more lenient with the accused than might be prudent. -
Many such statutes can reach only collection agencies, or businesses purporting to
be collection agencies, and so have no effect on self-collectors and grantors. Moreover,
since the debtor receives no compensation for a violation, he has little motivation to
report and challenge such practices.
Regulation by licensing is not totally valueless, however. It serves a necessary --
although perhaps insufficient -- function in screening new applicants for the business,
and the regulations undoubtedly deter at least some agencies from behaving
overzealously. Additionally, since the prohibited practices are normally not actionable
at common law, in any case, even the possibility of enforcement provides greater
21. For an illustration of just how extreme the outrage can be, see Dut' v. General Finance Co.. 154 Tex. 16. 273 S.W. 2d
64 (1954).
22. Magruder. Mental and Emotional Disturbance in Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Hare. L. R. 1033, at 1035;
quoted by Prosser, supra. Sect. 12, at 51.
23. E.G.. Exparte Hammett. 259 Ala. 240, 66 So. 2d 600 (1953); Bartou' v. Smith. 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E. 2d 735
(1948).
24. See note, 10 B.C. Ind. & Comm. LR. 702 (1969).
25. E.g.. Ark. Star. Ann., Sect. 71-2008(10).
26. E.g.. Ark. Star. Ann., Sect. 71-2010 (fine): Me. Rev. Star. Ann., Tit. 32, sect. 573(2) (fine and/or imprisonment).
27. Washington requires that two members of the five man board be actively engaged in the business while serving.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. Sect. 19.16.280 (1974). Florida's members must be "representive of the various segments of
the industry." Fla. Stat. Ann. Sect. 559.69 (Supp. 1975).
protection than the debtor might otherwise enjoy.
B. Deceptive Trade Practices Acts
The Deceptive Trade Practices acts of the various states 28 -- initially and primarily
designed to regulate sales and advertising -- have also been applied to collection
practices. Like licensing statutes, such legislation normally includes a catch-all clause
forbidding practices which are "unfair to the consumer." 2- These phrases have become
springboards for debtor actions. The applicability of such acts to debtor-crcditor"
conflicts is also supported by a line of cases under the Federal Trade Commission Act,
as well as by the rules of the F.T.C. 30
The deceptive practices statutes enjoy the advantage (as compared with licensing
schemes) of being applicable to any person, not simply collection agencies. Again,
however, the remedial aspects are often disappointing. Although some states, such as
Massachusetts, 3 provide for both the recovery of damages and the securing of an
injunction, others, such as Maine, 32 permit only injunctive relief.
Where, as in some cases, a civil action cannot be brought, the debtor's motivation
to seek redress is, again, minimal. An additional problem is that, as all were enacted
without the particularities of debt collection in mind, none include lists of proscribed
practices. The debtor's task is then complicated, in that he must show not only that
collection practices themselves should fall within the scope of the law, but that the
conduct complained of is within the embrace of the clause forbidding unfair practices.
C. Uniform Consumer Credit Code
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) 33 gives short shrift to this
problem. It prohibits "fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the collection of debts"
31 arising from consumer transactions. Although this language is more inclusive than
that of the licensing statutes, it suffers from the same remedial weaknesses as many of
the deceptive practices acts: the only remedy provided for is an action to restrain the
conduct, and it fails to designate particular acts as fraudulent or unconscionable, thus
leaving a heavier burden on the debtor.
D. Model Consumer Credit Act
The UCCC, almost from the beginning, had more than its share of responsible
critics, among the most vehement of which was the National Consumer Law Center at
Boston College. Their response was to publish in 1970 an alternative proposal, the
National Consumer Act (NCA), 35 which incorporated some sections of the UCCC,
but introduced considerably greater restrictions on creditors' remedies. The NCA has
been supplanted by a later version, the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA), 36
published in 1973. Article Six, dealing with debt collection, remains substantially as it
appeared in the NCA: a comprehensive provision reflecting the viewpoint of the
consumer partisan.
Section Six of the Article defines terms and specifies prohibited practices, thereby
avoiding two pitfalls which plagued prior legislation. The act is specifically made
applicable to creditors and their agents, as well as independent agencies. The most
28. See Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Lgislation. 46 Tul. L. Rev. 724 (19"2). Note, Decepti e Consumer Sale,
Practices in Indiana. 2 Notre Dame J. of Leg. 81 (1975).
29. E.g.. Idaho Code Sects. 48-60312).
30. See 15 U.S.C. Sects. 41-58 (1970); 16 C.F.R. Sects. 237.0--6(1973).
31. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93A,. Sect. 9.
32. Me. Rev. Star. Ann., tit. 10 Sect. 1213.
33. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Uniform Consumer Credit Code (West Pub. Co..
1969).
34. Id.. Sect. 6.111 (1).
35. National Consumer Law Center. Inc.. National Consumer Act (Boston. 1970).
36. National Consumer Law Center. Inc.. Alodl Consumer Credit Act 19'3 (Boston. 1973).
common tactics of coercive collectors are catalogued in subparagraphs, each of which is
preceded by the disclaimer "without limiting the general application of the foregoing,
the following conduct is a violation of this section."
The MCCA would effect a crucial expansion in debtor's remedies, the area of
major inadequacies in earlier legislation. A violation of the ban on unethical practices
would make the collector liable for (a) a fine of not less than $100 nor more $2500,
determined by the court, and (b) the actual damages, including any incidental,
consequential and special damages, sustained by the consumer as a result of the
violation. 3, In addition, if the plaintiff-debtor can show a "willful and knowing
violation" of the Act, he may be awarded exemplary damages. 38
From the debtor's perspective, the MCCA is clearly superior to prior regulatory
devices. The model act applies to all persons collecting debts. It requires no proof of
damage for recovery. It specifies illegal tactics, but expressly rejects an overly narrow
interpretation of its coverage. It provides for injunctive relief as well as damages.
Finally, it provides that where a debtor has proven harassment, conviction of the
collector-- beyond rendering him civilly liable -- creates a complete bar to any further
claim on the debt at issue. A more stringent combination of penalties is realistically
unimaginable.
E. Recent State Statutes
Since the publication of the 1970 NCA, a number of states -- among them
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Florida, and Washington -- 39 have adopted similar statutes,
which are illustrative of the maximum degree of protection .afforded debtors on the
state level. Each of these states, paralleling the MCCA, provides a list of prohibited
practices, and three of the four apply the provisions to all collectors of debts. In the
specifics of their remedies, however, there is significant diversity both among the states
and between each state and the MCCA. One notable point of convergence among all
five, though, rests in their allowance of a recoverable penalty even in the absence of a
showing of actual damages.
The Florida provisions most nearly parallel those of the MCCA, although its
remedies are even more formidable than those proposed by the model law. Whereas the
MCCA allows automatic recovery of at least $100 plus actual damages, with punative
damages possible upon a showing of willfulness, the Florida plaintiff who shows a
violation of the act is entitled to recover either $500 or his actual damages (whichever
is greater), plus costs and attorney's fees. Punative damages are within the court's
discretion, as is such equitable relief as it may deem necessary.
Recovery of such minimum penalties is available in each of these states.
Massachusetts grants $25 or actual damages, plus attorney's fees. Wisconsin has an
intriguing arrangement: the debtor may recover actual damages plus twice the finance
charge involved, as long as the total amount is at least $100 but not more than $1000.
Washington's statute makes the finance charge (as well as similar costs) unrecovera-
ble, and the debtor is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. Washington's legislature
has given the courts a potent weapon with which to strike at particularly onerous or
recidivous offenders: at its discretion, the court may grant up to three times the actual
damages to an aggrieved plaintiff. 40
37. Id, Sect. 8.108.
38. Id., Sect. Sect. 8.110.
39. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., Ch. 93A, Sect. 9: Wisc. Scat. Ann., Sect. 427.103; Fla.Sra. Ann., Sect. 559.55 (Supp. 1975):Wash. Rev. Code Ann., Sect. 19.16.450 (Supp. 1974).
40. id., Sect. 19.86.090.
Since the MCCA was designed as a total alternative to the UCCC, the attempts of
several states to extract and adopt only certain sections, e.g., the debt collection article,
leads to some confusion. Specifically, while Florida adopted a strong MCCA-style act, it
positioned it amid related matters and attempted to link it by reference to the older
licensing requirements, with a less than totally satisfying result. 41  So too, both
Washington and Massachusetts divided the relevant sections into several parts, scattered
them throughout their volumes, and incorporated by reference their deceptive trade
provisions, further muddying the waters. 42
Statutes such as these provide more protection than is generally available, and, in
some instances, more potent remedies than even the ambitious MCCA. Yet the
shortcomings which remain, such as the confusion and overlapping of some, and, most
significant, the fact that such statutes are comparative rarities, has led to the proposal of
a similar Federal provision.
V. The Debt Collection Practices Act
Representative Annunzio's proposal, H.R. 10191, 43 would amend the Consumer
Credit Protection Act by adding a Title VII: Debt Collection Practices. The language
of the bill evinces a familiarity with the MCCA and an intention to assume a similar
posture; in fact, a number of sections have been inserted virtually verbatim from the
model code. 4
The legislation would apply only to transactions between an individual consumer
and a creditor, and only to credit or goods extended for personal, family or household
use. 45 Transactions between merchants and similar business dealings are excluded. 46
Significantly, the act would not affect. everyone engaged in the collection of debts:
banks, officials acting under court order, attorneys, original grantors of credit, and
certain others are all specifically exempted from coverage. 47 The question of whether
such limitations are advisable is more dependent upon an individual conception of the
public policy to be served than upon any more objective criteria.
Specific practices are prohibited, and in this respect Rep. Aniunzio's bill is more
comprehensive than any currently in effect: some 47 sub-paragraphs relate to acts of
harassment, unfair practices and misleading representations. 48 Virtually every offensive
tactic commonly used or reported in the case law appears to be covered; this is a
valuable element, since conduct is included which would not likely be actionable under
common law theories. 49 Expanding upon another MCCA section, agencies are required
to assemble files for each account of over $100, in conformity with set standards, and to
apprise the debtor of their existence and of his right of access to them. 50
Failure to comply with any of these provisions would make the collector civilly
liable according to a plan which is also nearly identical to the MCCA arrangement.
41. Fla. Stat. Ann. Sects. 19.16.110; 19.16.440 (Supp. 1975).
42. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93, Sects. 24-28, 49; Ch. 93A, Sects. 2,9. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. Sects. 19.16.100-.950,
19.86.090 (Supp. 1974).
43. H.R. 10191, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1975) currently under study by the Consumer Affairs subcommittee of the
House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing.
44. E.g., compare H.R. 10191 Sect- 802(6) with M.C.C.A. Sect. 6.202(d).
45. H.R. 10191 Sects. 801(c),(g),(i).
46. For a discussion of the differences between the creditor-consumer and creditor-merchant relationships, see Leff,
Injury, Ignorance and Spite -- The Dynamici ofCoercive Collection, Yale LU I (1970).
47. H.R. 10191 Sect. 801(e)(2).
48. Id.. Sects. 802, 805.
49. See e.g., id.. Sect. 802(3) -- intentional infliction of mental distress, Sect. 802(14) -- defamation.
50. Id.. Sects. 806, 809, 810.
Under this section the debtor is entitled to his actual damages, if any, as well as
between $100 and $2500, as the court shall decide, plus with costs and attorney's fees.
The court may also award punative damages, and any equitable relief requested. Here,
too, a finding of an intentional violation will constitute a complete bar to any further
claim on the debt. 51
Jurisdiction is granted for such an action to an) appropriate U.S. District Court,
or to any other court of competent jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy. Suit must be brought within two years of the violation, except that where
a defendant has wilfully misrepresented material information, the action can be
initiated within two years after the discovery of that fact. A later section allowing for
exemption of states from the force of the Title provides that these jurisdictional matters
cannot be exempted.
5 2
As Massachusetts does, 53 H.R. 10191 would allow the private attorney general
concept of enforcement. That is, any affected consumer could sue under the declaratory
judgment provision of the U.S. Code (Title 28, Sect. 2201), asking for a declaration of
unlawful conduct and for appropriate civil relief. Prior to suit, the plaintiff must invite
the United States, through the Attorney General, to join as co-plaintiff. Provision is
made for governmental intervention where appropriate, and for equal division of
damages between the individual plaintiff and the U.S. 4
Criminal liability is also specified: an intentional violation would render the
collector liable for a fine of not more than $5,000, or a prison term of not more than
one year, or both. 5s As an instrument of deterrence the criminal penalty is useful, but
it is not as valuable to the consumer as the protection and recovery afforded by the
prescribed civil remedies. Finally, the Federal Trade Commission would be charged
with promulgating regulations to explain and enforce the new law. Jurisdictional
requirements (such as the necessity that the defendant be engaged in commerce) would
be removed, and the full powers of the Commission would be applied. 56
If passed, the act would not affect similar state laws "except to the extent that
those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to (that)
extent." 57 Thus the law would allow a measure of local autonomy and experimenta-
tion, as long as the minimum protection was granted: "A court shall not find any
provision of a State law to be inconsistent ... if it affords equal or greater protection to
a consumer. "58 If the Commission determines that the comparable law of a particular
state provides substantially equal protection, and adequate enforcement, they may by
regulation exempt that state from compliance with the title. 59
VI. Conclusion
There is a spectre haunting America. It is the spectre of over-regulation. A
politically popular issue, the charge has been made against much consumer-oriented
law. In some respects, it may be a valid criticism of H.R. 10191. Aside from the
bureaucratic facets (e.g., record-keeping) of the act, its substantive portions raise the
possibility that it will dis-serve its legitimate ends.
51. id.. Sect. 811(b).
52. id., Sect. 820.
53. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93A, Sect. 2.
54. H.R. 10191, Sect. 812(a),(c),(d).
55. Id., Sect. 814.
56. Id.. Sects. 816, 817.
57. Id.. Sect. 819.
58. Ibid.
59. Id.. Sect. 820.
For example, extrajudicial collection is used as an economical altemative to
litigation; in this light it is often viewed as beneficial to the creditor's interests, and
indeed it is. Yet, despite the multiplicity of abuses, it can also be advantageous to the
debtor, in that it provides a forum for explanation and accommodation, and encourages
the informal settlement of disputes. The possibility exists that, under a law such as the
one proposed, creditors fearful of inadvertent violation would more readily resort to
litigation. This would be less desirable, from the debtor's point of view, than the
opportunity for personal contact, even where accompanied by a limited degree of abuse.
Yet such contact rarely remains amicable for very long, and most debtors fail to
pay simply because they cannot. Under the new law creditors' suits would probably
remain at the current levels. The possibility that debtors' suits would multiply is
unlikely, for two reasons. First, the law would force higher standards of behavior on
collection agencies, which would minimize the likelihood of actions by debtors.
Second, those suits which were brought could be disposed of more rapidly: rather than
a prolonged effort to assert a tort claim, for example, the more expedient declaratory
judgment could be sought. The net result would be fewer and more easily resolved
cases.
The breadth of the prohibited practices also suggests the possibility that debtors
will congest the courts. Here reliance must be placed on both the good faith of debtors
and their counsel, and on the good sense of the courts. It seems unlikely that anything
shy of real abuse would drive a debtor (not normally eager to publicize his situation) to
legal actions, and equally unlikely that attorneys would risk disciplinary action by
bringing unwarranted claims for which recovery would be minimal. This may simply
be a risk which must be assumed, at least initially, to assure adequate protection.
Another potential drawback is that such regulation would raise the price of credit
or goods, since they reflect the prevailing risk of unrecoverable debts and, in this case,
of the liability of the collector to suit. Such an effect is not assured, however. Again a
multiplication of suits -- and therefore of liability -- is unlikely. Also, the fact that the
legislation exempts self-collectors (such as many small retailers) and most larger
creditors (such as banks) raises substantial doubt as to whether any negative impact
would be appreciable.
These exemptions present another question as to the law's effectiveness. It is the
moderately large creditor who most often resorts to agencies to collect its debts. If such
creditors organize their own collection departments, they will apparently be free to
circumvent the legislation, subject only to the constraints of their state law. The issue
of exemptions, like many others in the proposal, is essentially one of balancing: it
would be incongruous to apply the law to all creditors, as it would presumably then be
extendable even to one's newspaper carrier. Yet there appears no clearly reliable
indication of where the line should be drawn, and the Annunzio bill sets it at as logical
a place as can be suggested.
Despite these uncertainties, Rep. Annunzio's proposed bill would serve a useful
and important public purpose by unifying and simplifying the requirements and
procedures for the collection of debts and the prevention of abuses. If it can adequately
protect debtors from unconscionable forms of abuse, while preserving the creditor's
rights to his remedies, and avoid significant increases in litigation and in creditors'
costs, the law would be a considerable contribtuion to the public good.
